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Introduction
This paper presents the theoretical and methodological framework of our research
project, "Political Liberalisation and Economic Reform in Southern Africa". The
project consists of two separate studies. Lise Raker analyses the interconnections
between political and economic liberalisation in Zambia between 1991 and 1996.
Tor Skålnes examines the politics leading to the establishment in South Africa of
NEDLAC, a corporatist body with representatives drawn from unions, business
organisations and the government. NEDLAC and its predecessors (NEF and
NMC) have played important roles in the process ofeconomic liberalisation and
world market integration in that country. The two research projects share a
theoretical and methodological framework. From the comparative literature on the
politics of economic reform in the developing part of the world we extract two
central hypotheses regarding the prospects for designing and implementing
fundamental policy changes in democratic institutional settings. The first of these
is the "honeymoon thesis", which argues that new and weakly institutionalised
democratic regimes may be able to implement economic reforms if and only if the
new leadership acts resolutely during the first few years of Its incumbency. During
this grace period, the argument goes, reforms wil have to be implemented in a
rather authocratic fashion. Political coalition-building must be postponed until the
reforms have been made to stick and clear winners can be discerned. The second
hypothesis is somewhat at odds with this reasoning; this is the "corporatist thesis" .
The basic premise of corporatist thinking is that interest groups may in fact play
an active and positive role in the process of implementing economic reform, to the
extent that the government is wiling to grant these groups a formalised and
institutionalised place together wIth government at the. bargaining table. . To the
extent that such democratic- or societal-corporatist institutions are successfully
established, a fairly thoroughgoing democratisation of society's institutions can be
achieved simultaneously with economic liberalisation and macroeconomic
stabilsation.
Lise Rakner argues that Zambia is an important testing ground for the
honeymoon thesis. Right after being propelled into government on a wave of
popular enthusiasm in 1991, President Frederick Chiluba and the MMD
implemented one of the most resolute and thoroughgoing programmes of
stabilisation and liberalisation ever being undertaken. What are the experiences so
far with these policies and the way they were implemented? Does this experience
provide support for the honeymoon thesis? Can Zambia provide a model for other
African countries ostensibly trying to achieve both economic and political
liberalisation simultaneously?
Tor Skålnes argues, among other things, that corporatist institutions were
established in South Africa largelyas a result of pressure by the country's trade
unions and, playing a secondary but nevertheless important role, business
associations. These institutions have been quite essential when Itdcomes to
fashioning a set of economic policies which try, in a gradualist fashion, to
liberalise the economy and make the industrial sector more competitive, reduce
l
the budget deficit, and find new and creative ways to effect a modicum of asset
redistribution.
By analysing the political and economic reform processes currently being
undertaken in Zambia and South Africa, the aim is to contribute to the ongoing
international debate on the politics of economic reform. Africa has long been all
but ignored by leading theorists in this field. On their part, Africanists have only
too seldom systematically related their studies of the polItical economy of
structural adjustment to the theoretical issues raised by mainstream comparative
scholarship. Consequently, Africanists have beensidelined in the debate on
economic reform politics. We wish to counter this trend, by systematically relating
our two in-depth case studies to a debate which, to the extent that it has been
grounded empirically, has thus far been dominated by cross-national analyses of
reform efforts in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. In the first section,
we brie fly discuss some major theoretical issues raised by these cross-national
studies. In the sec ond and third sections, we present the tentative results of the
two research projects. The fourth section is devoted a discussion of our choice of
design and method.
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I: The Politi es of Economie Reform
Several countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa recently
replaced authoritarian governments with elected ones. At the same time, many of
these countries were grappling with the consequences of failed economic policies.
This failure was often among the direct causes of demands for political change.
Both intern al and external actors pressed for reform. A dual process of political
and economic liberalisation was thereby set in force in several corners of the
world, a process which reached the African continent by the end of the 1980s.
Consequently, the relationship between economic and political change has again
become the subject of a lively theoretical debate. As yet, the causal connections
between economic development strategy and form of government are far from
established. Among the unresolved questions are the following. Are certain
political regimes better able to undertake structural economic reforms? Are
democratic institutions capable of promoting rapid economic change? These
questions constitute the point of departure for this joint research project.
The concept of political liberalisation refers to the relaxation of
government controls of the political activities of the citizens by a1lowing for
greater pluralism of opinion and associations (Bratton and van de Walle 1992).
Politicalliberalisation may, or may not, 1ead to fully fledged democracy, which
may be understood as systems of governance guaranteeing free elections at regular
intervals between competing parties, and in which freedoms of speech and
association are underpinned by the rule of law (Dahl 1971, Diamond, Linz and
Lipset 1990). Economic liberalisation implies a greater role for markets, reduced
state intervention and greater world market integration (Haggard and Kaufman
1989).
The authoritarianism thesis
The conventional wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s considered democratic regimes
less able to undertake economic reform than authoritarian ones. Consequently,
democratisation was viewed as detrimental to necessar policy change. As the
argument went, economic stabilisation and liberalisation would typically be
undertaken by authoritarian regimes since such regimes did not face electoral
pressures that gave rise to political business cycles and were, more generally , able
to insulate themselves to a greater extent from interest group pressures and
achieve state autonomy (Skidmore 1977, Kaufman 1985). The great majority of
scholats agreed. that . economic changes would, in t1:e sh9rt run, be strongly
opposed byexisting interest groups because, among other things, losers would
feel the pain before winners experienced the gain (Lal 1983, Nelson 1984, 1990,
Haggard and Kaufman 1991 and Haggard and Webb 1992). This reasoning was
inspired by public choice theory, and especially the work of Mancur Olson (1982).
As the decade progressed, however, it became increasingly clear not only
that many authoritarian regimes were incapable of dealing with the severe
economic crises gripping their countries, but also that many democratic countries
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did have capacity to do so (Remmer 1986, 1990, 1993). Nevertheless, research
undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s indicated that authoritarian regimes
were better than democracies at certain specific tasks - such as stamping out very
high inflation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992:272) and pushing through
thoroughgoing trade liberalisation, not just macroeconomic stabilisation (Kaufman
and Stallngs 1989: 205-212). Some evidence was also found that newly formed
democracies experienced deeper problems stabilsing and liberalising than did
either established democracies or authoritarian regimes, due to high popular
expectations of economic improvement and significant redistribution in the wake
of transitions from authoritarian rule(Haggard and Kaufman 1989).
As far as Africa was concerned, however, the authoritarianism thesis was
not widely supported (major exceptions of sorts are Callaghy 1990 and Callaghy
and Ravenhil 1993) since it had become quite evident that most authoritarian
regimes on the continent were responsible for gross mismanagement of their
economies. Most of these governments were incapable of instigating reform in any
but the most half-hearted way. A number of political scientists argued that there
was a direct causal link between autocratic exercise of political authority and
economic crisis. Authoritarian leaders, it was held, lacked legitimacy and
remained in power only on account ofpatronage and repression (Sandbrook 1985,
Herbst 1990, van de Walle 1994). Authoritarian states on the African continent
were deemed to be far from autonomous and strong; in fact, they were weak and
had be come penetrated by rent-seeking coalitions. Authoritarianism itself was
often said to have encouraged the very formation and multiplication of such
coalitions (e.g., Bates 1989, Skålnes 1995). By the late 1980s, aid donors belatedly
concluded that political change and better governance were prerequisite to
economic reform insub"-Saharan Africa. These ideas were given quasi-official
sanction by the publication in 1989 of a World Bank report, From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth , which emphasised the importance of the rule of law,
property rights, increased accountabilty of public officiais, and greater
transparency in decision-making. From then on, the donor view has been that
economic and political liberalisation are not only compatible but interdependent
and should be promoted simultaneously (Moore 1993, Robinson 1995).
The honeymoon the sis
Reflecting this change in donor thinking, as well as new empirical realities, the
academic climate had changed fundamentally by the mid-1990s. It is now well
accepted that regime type is lÎòt a paricularlygood predictor of economic policy
change (Bates and Krueger 1993: 459; Haggard and Webb 1993: 144-147;
Wiliamson and Haggard 1994: 568-569). The authoritarianism thesis has be en
discarded. It is widely agreed that even the earlier belief that new and
unconsolidated democracies face unusual problems when trying to implement
thoroughgoing liberalisation or eradicate hyperinflation, has not held up to
empirical scrutiny. Elected governments in countries such as Poland, Argentina,
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Peru, Venezuela and Zambia -someof them new democracies,somenot-so-new
- all moved in the 1990s to implement the most comprehensive and far-reaching
of reform packages in the context of high, sometimes extremely high, inflation.
The conventional wisdom of the mid-1990s is that newly elected leaders enjoy a
honeymoon period before politics reverts to its reform-resistant normal state,
especially to the extent that the government has the solid backing of a large or
even dominant party and the opposition is fragmented and disorganised
(Wiliamson and Haggard 1994, Haggard and Webb 1994, Nelson 1993).
However, the fact.- that it is of ten democraticgovernments which
implement the most far-reaching policychangesdoes not mean that these policies
are necessarily democratically arrived at in the sense that they are products of a
deliberative process. In fact, according to Joan Nelson, "(i)nitial stages of
adjustment were almost always carried out in an autocratic and technocratic
manner, even in countries with firmly democratic political systems" (1993: 438).
The tendency for reform to entail delegation of responsibility to the executive,
concentration of power into a few hands (typically the central bank and the finance
ministry) and insulation of technocrats from interest-group pressure has been
noted by many (P.H. Smith 1991: 623, Bates and Krueger 1993: 462, O'Donnell
1994, Haggard and Webb 1994: 13). The honeymoon period is frequently used to
spring surprises upon one's supporters, as Carlos Menem did to the Peronists in
Argentina or Carlos Andrés Pérez did to his Acción Democrática party in
Venezuela (Naim 1993). Sometimes such resolute reformers have managed to put
the economy back into sufficient shape to win the next election (Menem, Peru's
Alberto Fujimori), sometimes not (Pérez, Solidarity in Poland, several other
reformist paries in Eastern Europe).
The-comparative--literature, then, has movedto focus on the politics of
economic reform within formally democratic institutions. The emphasis is on
formally since many democratic governments behave somewhat like their
authoritarian counterparts and resort for a while to insulated, technocratic
policy-making. By implication, state autonomy is possible to achieve within
formally democratic institutional arrangements, and it is such autonomy which
accounts for reform. For various reasons, mobilsing support for stabilsation and
liberalisation looks difficult: costs are certain but benefits unc1ear; sacrifices are
immediate while rewards may be long postponed; losers are identifiable and often
concentrated to politically important urban areas while potential winners are
diffuse or dispersed, of ten over remote rural areas. Under such circumstances,
organised interest groups would seem to represent major brakes on reform,
whether or not they contributed to implementing protectionist . and populist
economic policies in the first place (Bates 1990, Lofchie 1994). If interest groups
are status quo-oriented, then unusual politics would seem to be required for some
time, until the new institutions and policies have been given sufficient time to
induce the formation of a new set of interests tied to economic liberalism, interests
which can thenbe safely mobilised politically (Nelson 1993; Haggard and Webb
1994: 16).
5
Recentresearch hasquestioned, however, the contention that in every
country undergoing structural adjustment there exists a politically aroused, solidly
anti-reform civil society. At the very least, it has become clear that organisations
representing business and labour, the very groups that protectionism and
expansionary fiscal policy are intended to benefit, are rarelyable, and sometimes
not wiling, to block reform. According to Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, "one
of the most surprising findings of our case studies is the degree to which the
intervention of interest groups fails to account for the initiation, or lack of
initiation, of policy reform" (1993: 455). Barbara Geddes similarlypaints a picture
of passive or ineffectual civil society organisations and locates, instead, opposition
to liberal reforms in the bureaucracies, militaries and ruling parties of the
developing world (Geddes 1994a, 1995; see also Bienen 1990: 727). This, then,
would seem to indicate that what finance ministers and other economic
policy-makers need is insulation from fellow politicians and bureaucrats and not
so much the of ten called-for autonomy from business groups and trade unions.
The corporatist thesis
While modifying the long-held presupposition among political economists that
interest groups play negative roles during policy reform, Bates and Krueger, and
Geddes, fail to capture the complexity of empirical reality when they characterise
interest groups as largely irrelevant. Even for crisis-ridden Argentina of the 1980s,
a case which has figured prominently in the literature on the politics of economic
reform, this is much too simplistie. Wiliam C. Smith has documented that
Argentine business and labour, seeing the need for policy change (though not
necessarilydagreeing on what kind), actively engaged hi policyëieliberations with
the Alfonsín government during its attempt to stamp out inflation. Even as such
concertation failed, largely because of the disinterest shown by the economy
minister, the government continued to negotiate with organisations representing
particular sections of business and the trade union movement (W.c. Smith 1991:
278-291). What this shows is the heterogeneous nature of economic interests in
this important Latin American country, as well as the active involvement of
organisations in, and their sometimes positive attitude towards, policy reform.
Argentina is no exceptional case. In fact, heterogeneity of interests and complex
variation in interest group policy response and degree of political initiative are
themes which run through Joan M. Nelson's comparative study of Latin America
and Eastern Europe. While, in her view, labour unions react mostly to government
initiative (often opposing, sometimes acquiescingin specific changes), business
associations happen on occasion to be deeply involved in designing new liberal
policies, such as in Bolivia in the mid-1980s (Nelson 1994b: 180). Skålnes'
research on Zimbabwe similarly documents that broad-based industry associations
can be among the initiators of structural adjustment even though the businesses
they represent have often benefited from protection in the past (Skålnes 1993,
1995).
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Does the sometimes Hactive involvement of interestgroups in policy
discussions give rise to more formalised and institutionalised co-operation
between them and the government, that is, to democratic or societal corporatism?
To the extent that concertation is attempted, is it successful or does it fail the way
it did in Argentina? It has long been recognised that societal corporatism can
facilitate necessary policy change and economic adjustment and contribute to
economic growth (Cameron 1984; Katzenstein 1985; Lange and Garett 1985;
Pekkarinen, Pohjola and Rowthorn 1992; Henley and Tsakalotos 1993).
However, almost all the evidence comes from Western El11Qpe. Rarely do
developing countries possess the strongly centralised and broad-based trade
unions and other interest groups found in Europe (Nelson 1991). Nevertheless,
Bates and Kreger argue that "when politicalleaders in our sample set of countries
commtted themselves to more liberal economic policies, some (in Chile, Zambia)
appear to have sought to form structures of corporatist bargaining " (1993:
460-461). State-society relations in Zimbabwe are also strongly reminiscent of
Western European corporatism, although labour has so far been exc1uded (Skålnes
1995).
To sum up, the theoretical debate on the politics of economic reform in the
mid-1990s has evolved to varying degrees from its initially statist orientation in
the 1980s. The literature now documents that economic reforms may be
undertaken by democratic as well as authoritarian governments, by weakly as well
as strongly institutionalised regimes, and by autonomous as well as corporatist
states. Two distinct arguments can be discerned: ane group of scholars see
implementation of reform as necessitating autocratic practises in the initial phases,
that is, the insulation of a technocratic elite from popular and interest group
-pressures~Whenthe-Teformshavebeen put in place.,however, such. technocrats
must reach out to the population and build coalitions of support among reform
beneficiaries. From this perspective, which has not departed all that much from
statism and the authoritarianism thesis of the 1970s and 1980s, interest groups are
seen as reform-resistant and should therefore be politically controlled or isolated
during the implementation of economic reform.
The other group of scholars employ an institutionalist analysis which
departs from statism by emphasising the positive role of intermediation between
state and civil society throughout the reform process. According to this view,
democratisation of political life may have positive effects on economic policy.
Given certain institutional conditions, interest groups wil, on balance, serve to
improve economic policy-making rather than hinder the reform process. Popularly
elected officials enjoy greater legitimacy and are not as dependent as are
authoritarian rulers on rent -seeking and patronage so as to remain in power. The
various counterweights to state power that exist in more democratic regimes
increase governmental accountability and are regarded as fundamental to the
improvement of policy and economic performance (e.g., van de Walle 1994,
Bratton 1992). Arguably, the positive role ascribed to interest groups in several
World Bank documents and some scholarly literature appears to be based more on
hopes than on empirical evidence. Some of these writings imply, fallaciously, that
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since authoritarianism was ubad for theeconomy, democracymust beugood.
However, as seen above, some empirical evidence does exist to document that
broad-based interest associations can be among the initiators of economic reform
and thus play an active role in the implementation of structural change.
In the next two sections the two theoretical positions wil be discussed
against two contemporar reform efforts in sub-Saharan Africa,. namely Zambia
and South Africa.
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IL: Testing the theoretieal positions .
11.1: The Honeymoon Thesis: The Case of Zambia (by Lise
Rakner) 1
In 1991, Zambia reintroduced multi-party democracy. The new government
simultaneously embarked on a wide-ranging economic reform programme aimed
at restructuring the formerly state-controlled economy. The aim of this study is to
examine how democratisation hasaffected ecÔnomic decision-making during the
first election period of Zambia's third republic2. As an example of a new and
weakly institutionalised democracy which attempts to implement economic
reforms, Zambia seems ideally suited among the sub-Saharan African countries to
"test" the honeymoon thesis. This thesis, and the more specific implications that
can be derived from it, form our analytical framework.
At the time of independence in 1964, Zambia had gre at economic promise
compared not only to other African countries but also to later NICs such as Korea
(World Bank 1989). The new nationalist government embarked upon a strategy of
industrialisation through import substitution. Economic and political resources
were increasingly monopolised; in 1972 Zambia became a one-party state and the
authorities took controlover the major economic resources (Burdette 1988). By
1980, due to economic, political and administrative decay, Zambia was under
heavy pressure from the international financIal institutions to restructure the
economy. However, the various.reform programmesimplemented during Kenneth
Kaunda's reign failed. This failure is usually attributed to the existence of strong
'Urban ihtëresCgroupsÖpposing refÖrms. Scholarshãve argued that due to a lon g
tradition of subsidising consumer goods, the United National Independence Party
(UNIP) was very vulnerable to urban protest (Callaghy 1990, Bates and Coller
1993). This points to the special character of Zambia's contemporar political and
economic situation. The unabating decline of the Zambian economy throughout
the 1980s became a main rallying cry for opposition against the one-party regime.
Former opponents of the economic reforms now campaigned against Kaunda and
UNIP on a ticket of economic liberalisation (Rakner 1992). The forces opposing
one-party rule had their organisational base in the Zambian trade union movement,
but the unusual "rainbow coalition" also included the business community, UNIP
dissidents, the church, students and academics. The economic reform programme
whichhas been pursued since 1991 is thus implemented by a government which
initially based its support on an allance of labour and business interests.
The honeymoon thesis posits a need to balance political and economic
considerations and consists of two main hypotheses:
The project is entitled: "Do all good things go together?" Political and economic
liberalisation in Zambia 1991-1996. To be presented as a Dr. Polit. Dissertation.
2 The second parliamentary and presidential elections in Zambia's third republic are
scheduled for October 25, 1996.
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(i) Newly elected governments, though unconsolidated, may be able to
implement far-reaching economic reforms if the new leaders display an
adequate understanding of the economic crisis and an ability to act quickly.
In the initial stages economic considerations must take the centre stage.
Reforms should be implemented immediately after the first election in
order to take advantage of electorallegitimacy and the fact that traditionally
reform-resistant interest coalitions are in organisational disarray and need
time to regroup.
(ii) In order to consolidate economic reforms after the first autocratic
implementation phase, governments must in due time before the next
election seek to renew and institutionalise contact with groups and
associations deemed to have benefitted from new policy. It is assumed that it
is possible to discern such winners and that they can be mobilsed to support
the governing party based on their economic interests.
Based on these hypotheses, weraise some further questions:
How was the economic reform programme in Zambia implemented?
Were the major interest groups in the Zambian society opposed to the structural
adjustment reforms in 1991?
To what extent have interest groups affected the implementation of the
economic reform programme?
. Which actors outside cIvil society intluenced the economic reform programme?
Is it possible, during the 1991-96 period, to detect a shift of emphasis in MMD
policies away from~economic.considerationsand towards the politicsofsupport
mobilisation and even consensus building?
To what extent can the growing political opposition be explained as reaction
against economic reforms ?
How can, in the future, the 1996 election results be related to the governments
policies?
The centrality of the upcoming elections means that major fieldwork and data
collection must be undertaken in 1996. Nevertheless, let us focus on what we
know so far about Zambia's experience with economic reform under formally
democratic auspices.
Economic considerations: The first stages of implementing reform
On November 2, 1991, Frederick Chiluba was sworn in as Zambia's second
president. The tasks ahead were enormous for the new Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD) government. The country had difficulties servicing the huge
external debt. There were severe shortages of foreign exchange. The budget deficit
amounted to 6- 10 per cent of GDP. Inflation was into triple .digits. Infrastructure
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and .social services were deteriorating.. Throughout the election campaign, the
MMD expressed a clear intent to implement the structural adjustment reforms
recommended by the donors. The landslide election victory which gave the MMD
a 125-seat majority in parliament and reduced UNIP to a regional party with 25
seats from the Eastern Province, provided the government with a clear mandate
for change. It was such mandate and legitimacy that UNIP had lacked. The MMD
had mobilised both organised and diffuse and dispersed support around the
country. The party used it to push a number of politically difficult reform
measures. Due to the increasingly deteriorating economic situation, the
government viewed an attack on inflation as its most urgent task. It moved just as
quickly to free up foreign exchange. It took a number of measures to reduce the
budget deficit; most importantly , maize subsidies were removed. In both 1986 and
1990, attempts to reduce maize subsidies had led to riots and it was therefore
widely believed that such policies would amount to political suicide. But the
MMD eliminated all maize subsidies within a year without political turmoil. As a
result of the efforts of the new government, by 1994, Zambia's progress on
stabilsation was impressive. The generosity of donors did arguably play a large
role. Nevertheless, in addition to a good record in terms of inflation and fiscal
probity, Zambia could boast one of the most liberal foreign exchange regimes in
Africa. Reflecting on the first phases of reform implementation in the Zambian
Third Republic, van de Walle and Chiwele conc1ude:
"The landslide victory of the MMD gave it a legitimacy and popular support that
UNIP had lacked and the MMD took full advantage of the honeymoon period right
after the election .... By moving quickly, the MMD ensured that opposition would
not yet have mobilised effectively, while pressure gröups like the labour movement
that hàd.supportedflie MMD would take time to redefiiie theiire1aÏionship with the
government" (van de Walle and Chiwele 1994: 30).
Van de Walle and Chiwele's analysis lends credence to the honeymoon thesis. He
argues that reforms in the initial phases were implemented fast, insulating
economic policy-makers from potentially reform-resistant interest groups. aur
own preliminary analysis of the first years of reform supports the view that the
initial reforms were implemented rapidly and without interest group consultation.3
However, we question the notion that the major interest groups were opposed to
reform. As stated above, the failure to implement the structural adjustment reform
measures advanced by the World Bank and IMF under UNIP rule, are by most
analysts attributed to the organised and vocal opposition of labour (Ncube and
Ndulu 1987; Loxley and Young 1990).. Bates and Coller, on the contrary, attribute
the failed economic restructuring in Zambia not to the strength of interest groups,
but rather to the marginality or near absence of interest group influence on
The fact that the Zambian government on a number of occasions was critcised by the
World Bank for moving too fast and for giv ing too liule consideration to social safety nets and the
protection of local industry further ilustrates the 'shock therapy' manner in which the initial
reforms were implemented. Personal interviews, World Bank, Lusaka June 1995, and Africa
Confidential voL. 34, no 3, 1993.
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Zambian economicpolicy (Bates and Coller 1993, 1995). According to these
authors, the political structure of the Zambian one-party state created a bias
against producers, rural as urban. They argue that through the authoritarian
practices of UNIP, all the main interest organisations in Zambia - organised
labour, private business, commercial farmers - had become enemies of the pary.
UNIP therefore lacked the institutional means to secure backing for policy reforms
from these key interests (ibid.).
The political events taking place in Zambia in the late 1980s support the
argument presented by Bates and Coller. The MMD's 1991 election campaign
indicated c1ear support foreconomic liberalisation and structural adj u stment
reform. The representatives at various ladder steps in union hierarchy declared
their support for the economic reform proposals. Interviews with trade union
officials in 1991 nevertheless paint a picture of more ambivalent union attitudes to
change. Understanding of terms like privatisation and the impaCt of reform on
employment and consumer welfare was shaiiow4. On balance, however, it is not
possible to argue that the trade union movement was antagonistic to the economic
reform programme in 1991 and therefore an obstac1e to reform. The business
community and the commercial farmers supported the measures. From the time of
independence, the UNIP governments attitude towards African business was
ambivalent, and the government did not wish to be seen to directly promote their
interests. As a result, the government largely failed to develop institutions for
meaningful co-operation and bargaining (Beveridge and Oberschall 1979). As a
result, large parts of Zambian business remained estranged from UNIP. When the
one-party state began to crumble towards the end of 1989, businesspeople formed
the financial backbone of MMD (Rakner 1992, Akwetey 1994). Neither were
farmers-veryinfluential in the. Second Republic. A small, largely white-owned,
commercial farming sector was represented by the Commercial Farmers Bureau.
Though well organised, the CFB 's influence was limited due to its historical role
as a white settler organisation and its small size. The bi as against agricultural
producers during the one-pary state in Zambia is well documented (Bates 1976,
1981,Burdette 1988). Commercial farmers had for a long time argued in favour of
freeing agricultural markets and farmers became prominent in the MMD (Bratton
1992). The co-operative movement, representing the bulk of the numerous
small-scale farmers, was, in the Second Republic, so tightly controlled by UNIP
that the Zambian Co-operative Federation never became a significant pressure
group. On the basis of their organisational strength, opinions and actions it is
therefore difficult to argue that any of the main interest associations representing
workers,business and agriculture constitutedstrong anti-reform forces that would
either want, or be in a position to, if they wanted, oppose the economic reform
measures in 1991.
Whereas the initial stabilisation and liberalisation measures were relatively
successful, progress has been much slower in a number of reform areas which do
not immediately affect the stabilisation programme of the government, but without
which long-term economic growth wil bepie-in-the-sky. We refer to these
Personal interviews September and October 1991, see Rakner 1992.
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reforms as the structuralaspectsof . reform.. because they .involve ..institutional
change. The three main aspects of structural reforms laid out in the 1990 Policy
Framework Paper included agricultural marketing liberalisation, privatisation of
parastatals, and civil sector reform. Despite some progress made in liberalising the
agricultural sector, little success has been seen in the main sub-sector, maize
distribution. By the start of the 93/94 season, all maize production and marketing
subsidies had been removed and distribution was in principle determined by
market forces. However, the rapid liberalisation met with significant transition
problems as the private sector did not immediately replace the government. The
adjustment problems in agriculturewere exacetbated by a devastating drought in
1991/92. Agricultural producers were therefore very vulnerable to the credit
squeeze imposed as a consequence of stabilisation policies (Geisler 1992, van de
Walle and Chiwele 1994). By the end of 1993, a number of important commercial
farmers were bankrupt and the government was forced to introduce emergency
measures which again put the cash budget under strain (Profit Magazine, August
1993). These problems have greatly undermined confidence in the adjustment
programme and led to calls for its revers al by politicians and the press.5
The sec ond area of structural reform in Zambia on which, until the spring
of 1995, very little had been achieved, is the privatisation of approximately 150
state-owned companies. The privatisation effort appears initially to have been
blocked by political intrigue and administrative bottlenecks. While this issue calls
for further examination than can be achieved here, it is evident that privatisation
has been slow ed down by actors within the parastal body Zambian Industrial and
Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). When Zimco was. finally liquidated in March
1995, the pace of change grew markedly. Within months, the number of
companiesusold increasedfromfourin Januar to19in-May (ZPA Status Report,
May 31, 1995). So far, the third aspect of structural policy, cIvil service reform,
has stalled. A Public Sector Reform Programme was launched by the MMD
government in 1992 and promised to cut staff by 25 per cent within three years.
However, as yet not one person has been fired. The main obstac1e seems to be the
high cost of retrenchment packages negotiated with the unions (Personal
interviews, ZCTU and World Bank, Lusaka, June 1995).
Can the variance in reform performance be attributed to interest group
pressure? On balance, it cannot be argued that the economic adjustment
programme has been much affected by democratic concerns and interest group
participation. With reg ard to the initial phase of reform implementation, there are
few signs of consultation between the government and key interest associations.
Theleader of theZambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Fackson
Shamenda, has on a number of occasions criticised the government for leaving the
labour movement out when designing the programme. Increasingly, labour is
attributing the problems of the working class to government policies (The Weekly
Post, 8-14 October 1993, SAPEM, November 1994, The Post, 15 August 1995).
During the last two years, the critical comments on the agricultural reforms have increased
in the independent press. See: "The Mad Maize Merry-Go-Round, Profit Magazine, August 1993,
The National Mirror, June 25, 1995.
13
The influenceof the Zambian. trade union movement seems to have diminished
with the introduction of democracy. Due to its strong electoral showing, the
MMD does not fear the capacity of ZCTU to organise social unrest the way UNIP
did. During Kaunda's rule, every major strike and each single protest by unions
shook the government because it lacked popular legitimacy. The position of labour
in the third republic is further weakened by the fact that its membership constitute
a small proportion of the voting population and is almost entirely.limited to the
Copperbelt and Lusaka. Most parliamentarians therefore have little or no reason to
fear the power of organised labour in their district. As a result, the political
influence of ZCTU has not reached thelevelshoped for by its advocates. The fact
that ZCTU rarely figures in the public debate on economic issues, is evidence of
its marginalisation. Compared to the 1980s, the ZCTU of the 1990s appears more
selective in its opposition to government policies. The trade unions have accepted
inevitable sackings from the public service and instead concentrates on defending
redundancy packages (van de Walle and Chiwele 1994). With the exception of
civil service reform, it is therefore difficult to ascribe the slowness of reform to
the opposition of the labour movement.
Turning to the associations representing business and farming, it is equally
difficult to ascribe variance in economic performance to the active opposition
from these groups. The entire business community favours certain aspects of
reforms, such as the cash budget, privatisation and the fight against inflation. On
other aspects, business speaks with several tongues. Many businesses have been
hurt by the side-effects of stabilisation, such as extremely high interest rates. The
trade liberalisation policies were widely supported by the trading sector but led to
bitter accusations from the manufacturers. While the business community has
..becomeamoreinfluential force.inthe Third Republic;.the Influence of its main
lobby group, the Zambian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) should
nevertheless not be overestimated. At present, ZACCI membership totals 105
businesses - a limited organisational base. The associations representing farming
can at this stage not be regarded as a strong lobby for agriculture. In 1992, the
Commercial Farmers Bure.au became the Zambian National Farmers Union and
announced its intention to speak for all farmers. ZNFU at present has a
membership of about L ,600 individual farmers. According to van de Walle, the
number of small-scale farmers (farm size less than 20 hectares) in Zambia is about
120,000 while approximately 26,000 farms in private ownership are above 20
hectares and are c1assified as commercial farms (van de Walle and Chiwele 1994:
24). The restricted membership, coupled with the association's limited capacity for
technical and policy analysis, are viewedat present as undermining its ability to
participate in policy debate (ibid.).
Referring back to the first hypothesis of the honeymoon thesis, it is evident
that the implementation ofeconomic reforms in the Zambian Third Republic
aptly ilustrates the theoretical model: The initial stabilsation measures were
implemented rapidly and influence by interest groups in civil society was designed
by the government to be limited. However, contrary to the assumptions of the
honeymoon thesis, we argue that the main interest associations in Zambia were
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not opposed to the changes. The organisationalstrength, density ofnetwork and
analytic capacity of Zambian interest groups must not be overestimated (Rakner
1994). The MMD government does not appear to have attempted to utilise and
strengthen this potential support base. While the issue must await further analysis,
the varying degrees of success in terms of reform implementation may indicate
the limits of the reform strategy presented in the honeymoon thesis. The Zambian
experiences suggest that stabilsation measures can be implemented rapidly and
without the direct support of any particular group in civil society. The structural
reforms, involving institutional change, take longer and my reguire the active
fashioning of consensus and a wider support base, a factor that so far has not been
taken seriously in the Zambian Third Republic.
The limited results in terms of structural adjustment reforms point to a
larger problem of trying to undertake struCtural reforms while at the same time
undergoing a far-reaching macroeconomic stabilisation programme. However, the
Zambian case also indicates that forces within the state bureaucracy may
constitute as important obstac1es to reform as interest groups. According to
Barbara Geddes, the biggest, most articulate and politically influential losers from
the transition to a more market-oriented economy are government and ruling-party
officials and their cronies and alles (Geddes 1994b: 113). The preliminary
findings from the Zambian case sugge st a need to widen the analytical perspective
to include actors within the state apparatus.
Political considerations: The second phase of the Zambian reforms
As argued above, the honeymoon thesis presupposes a two-track policy in terms of
implementIîig reformiÏ: whicliIhe reforming government, in good time before the
next election, seeks to renew and institutionalise contact with groups and
associations deemed to have benefited from reforms. To what extent does the
Zambian experiences so far support the two-track notion of political and economic
considerations expressed in the honeymoon thesis? Is it possible to detect any
changes in the attitudes of MMD during this election period? Can it be argued
that at some stage, political considerationshave set in and a political project of
coalition-building has begun?
In 1996, the Zambian people wil again be able to voice their opinion on
the country's political and economic leadership in a national election with more
than one presidential candidate and a number of political paries6. While a final
evaluation cannot be provided at this point, recent events Ïn Zambia gives
credence to the existence. öf a two-trackpolicy in Zambia and a recent shift to
political considerations. January 1995 may be regarded as a turning point. Until
this date, the immediate stabilisation elements of the economic reform programme
were regarded to be "on track". However, in 1995, many of the achievements in
terms of reduction of inflation and elimination of the budget deficit appear to
Second time in the Third Republie (1991-). Zambia had a democratie constitution
between 1963 and 1972 when the one party state was created.
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have been lost. The main eventcausingthese changes wasthe governments
decision to divert K 70 bilion from the government budget in a failed attempt to
save the Meridian Bank BIOA from bankruptcy. A shar increase in the defence
budget has further increased the budget deficit. In addition, the government has
recently decided to postpone the introduction of a Land Bil, which opened up for
private ownership of land, when the Bil came under criticism by NGOs and the
press. The government has also indicated that discussions on privatising the mine
holding company ZCCM is to be postponed. Observers in Zambia suggest that
both the privatisation of the mInes and the Land Bil wil be left until after the
elections in 1996 (Personal interviews, Zambia Privatisation Agency, Lusaka
June 1995 and Anglo American Cooperation, Johannesburg, July 1995). By
September 1995 it is reported that the entire Structural Adjustment Programe
has been placed on the backburner until after the 1996 election (Africa
Confidential, 25 August 1995, National Mirror, September 24, 1995).
The political decision to halt the economic reform programme at this stage
must be related to the present political situation in Zambia. Rather than attempting
to build reformist coalitions, the MMD evidently has discarded the reform project
for fear of defeat in the upcoming elections. Ironically, one ofthe strongest threats
to the electoral survival of the MMD government may be Kenneth Kaunda and
UNIP. Kaunda, Zambia's president for 27 years, was recently reelected as the
leader of UNIP and has declared himself a presidential candidate. Equally
disturbing for MMD and Chiluba is the fact that their Bemba support base on the
Copperbelt is dwindling. A splinter group from MMD, Zambia Democratic
Congress, appears to be gaining support there(Africa Confidential, 25 August
1995; The Post, 15 August 1995). While the economic situation appears to be the
mainfocus ofopposition,none nof the challenger parties has.. suggested an
alternative strategy to the structural adjustment programme agreed with the donor
community. The opposition criticises MMD's implementation record and claims
that the economic misfortunes are largely caused by corrption and fraud by
government ministers (Weekly Mail and Guardian, January 20-26, 1995, Africa
Confidential, 36, 13, May 1995).
A thorough analysis of the sec ond stage in the honeymoon thesis, the
coalition-building phase, wil be done after the 1996 election. The present political
and economic situation in Zambia nevertheless points to a number of problems
with reform implementation in the manner prescribed in the honeymoon thesis.
Alternative positions found in the comparative literature clearly underscore the
need for establishing viable institutional mechanisms for cooperation and
consultation between the state and jnterestgroups in society in order to build
constituencies of support around the economic reforms. However, the lack of
political tradition for consultation and the inherent weaknesses of the Zambian
civil society have so far produced few changes to the old order of conducting
politics. The present government has indicated little interest in consulting major
associations. We have argued above that the main associations representing
commercial farmers, labour and business constituted a potential support base for
economic reforms. It is evident that, so far, the government has made little attempt
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toinstitutionalise tieswith these groups. The weak position of interestgroups, and
their shallow networks around the country, suggest, however, that even if
particular groups in Zambian society can be single d out as winners of the reform
programme, such as some business groups and possibly some farmers, their
impact on the CUffent process of political and economic liberalisation should not
be overestimated. Current political and economic developments in Zambia
indicate that the political project implied by the honeymoon thesis may prove
extremely difficult to achieve in a sub-Saharan African context, at least within a
five-year period between elections. Wil the 1996 election spell the end to
economic and for politicalliberalisation? Arguably, in the coming year Zambians
wil indeed be living in interesting times.
M ethodolo gical considerations
It is not possible to make a final evaluation of either the economic or political
reforms in Zambia based on a five-year period. Institutional change both with
regard to economic and to political reforms may well take decades. Institutional
evolution is often path-dependent in the sense that existing institutional structures
and history affect present and future reform efforts as well (North 1990, Putnam
1993). Nevertheless, studying the first election period in the Zambian Third
Republic provides important insights into the process of implementing and
consolidating economic reforms within new and weaky Institutionalised
democracies. While the main focus of the research project is the period between
1991 and 1996, the analysis wil also pay great attention to the economic and
political historyl~adingtothe events of 1991. H..
The discussion above has aimed to portray the current state of the dual
reform process in Zambia and discuss the empirical situation within a theoretical
framework. While the data already collected provide some tentative answers, the
empirical discussion has served mainly to form new questions and hypotheses to
guide further analysis. The main fieldwork is to take place between May and
December 1996. The work wil mainly be carried out in Lusaka, but
approximately one month wil be spent in Kitwe to consult the archives of the
Zambian Congress of Trade Unions and to car out interviews with
representatives of the labour movement. During the preparatory fieldwork in
Lusaka from May to June 1995, we took part in the formation of an informal
research group including a group of researchers from Harvard University and
Michigan State University, Uppsala University as well as Zambian economists and
political scientists which wil seek to co-ordinate research on the 1996 election
process. This network wil greatly facilitate the fieldwork in Zambia.
While in Zambia, newspaper sources, primary documents such as
parliamentary speeches, documents from the trade union federation, business
associations and farmer organisations as well as statistical material wjl be
collected. Contextual data regarding macroeconomic indicators of reform,
election data etc. can be obtained from the World Bank and the School of
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Business Administrationin Gothenburg which has caried out surveys on various
aspects of the economic reform programme in Zambia. Regarding election results
and survey data, contacts established with Michael Bratton (Michigan State
University/USAID) and Dan Posner (Harvard University) wil give access to
additional information. The short fieldwork conducted in Lusaka during the
summer of 1995, however, indicated that personal interview data wil bebf vital
importance in this analysis. Due to the current nature of the subject and the weak
analytical and technical capacity of major interest groups and parliament, there is
very liUle written material to base the analysis on. These interviews should follow
a loosely structured interview guide to ensurethara number of issues are touched
upon with all respondents. The discussion above has ilustrated that it wil not be
conducive to analysis to limit oneself to focus on interest-association responses to
government policy. It wil be necessary to include a number of respondents among
public servants. As a result, the analysis wil be structured around interviews with
representatives from labour, the business and farming lobbies, government
ministers, public servants in the ministries, and civil service as well as
representatives of the main opposition paries (UNIP, the National Party and
Zambia Democratic Congress) and the donors.
Il. 2: Corporatism and the Change to Liberal Economic Policies
in South Africa (by Tor Skålnes)
Contrary to popular fears among South African whites and against the
expectations of many foreign observers who have long been witnesses to the
declin~of economic~maJ:agement in post-indep~ndence Africa, the African
National Congress (ANC)-led Government of National Unit y (GNU), formed in
the aftermath of South Africa's first election under universal suffrage in April
1994, has so far resisted the temptation to resort to populist and protectionist
economic policies and is instead pushing for a programme of slow but steady trade
liberalisation coupled with fiscal and monetary restraint. Through the
Reconstruction and Development Programme, the GNU tries to redirect funds
towards education, health and housing for blacks without significantly expanding
the share of government expenditure in the Gross Domestic Product.
Although tariff reductions have been externally influenced - such
reductions were necessitated by the Marrakesh agreement of GATT , which is now
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) - trade and industry minister Trevor
Manuel has recently announced that he would like to see deeper tariff cuts for the
important motor industry and for texties and clôthingthan those. agreed with the
WTO. Foreign exchange controls have already been reduced through the
scrapping of the so-called financial rand. Meanwhile, proponents of state
ownership of productive enterprises are in retreat from the advances of those who
promote privatisation. Rather than nationalise the huge conglomerates that
dominate South Africa's economy, Trevor Manuel wants to encourage competition
and stimulate companies such as Anglo American to sell off subsidiaries. Such
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'unbundling' couldbenefit blacks directly tothe extent that they are able to pick up
the shares. Greater competition and lower barriers to entry are promoted as
policies beneficial to consumers, helpful to black business, and attractive to
foreign investors. The agriculture minister, Derek Hanekom, is trying to devise a
plan to use both market and administrative mechanisms so as to effect a
redistribution to black small-scale farmers of 30 per cent of the land currently
owned by of ten inefficient, input-intensive and heavily protected white
commercial farms. Together, these policies mark a momentous shift in the ANC's
economic philosophy away from statist socialism and towards liberal economic
thinking - with an egalitarian twist. This change in philosophy has, in part, been
documented by Kentridge (1993), Nattrass (1994) and Skålnes (forthcoming),
among others.
How can we account for the change to liberal economic policies in South
Africa? A standard interpretation of the ANC's change of mind is that the
organisation has been compelled to be realistic and to dampen the allegedly high
expectations of its mostly impoverished constituency so as to keep investors and
property owners happy. As a country with one of the most unequal income
distributions in the world, South Africa's newly established democracy would
seem to be a prime candidate for descent into the macro-economic populism
characteristic of many highly polarised societies (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991) -
were it not for the power of the white bourgeoisie. If this argument were correct,
we should expect the representatives of this bourgeoisie - the National Party, the
business associations - to be the lone farces behind fiscal prudence and
liberalisation. We should expect organisations representing blacks to ignore such
concerns and press for massively increased social expenditure and the creation of
jobs in the state-sector and protectedindustry. It is true that the NP has stood,
since the mid-1980s, for policies of privatisation, liberalisation and a reduced role
for government in the economy, after having spent four decades using all manner
of state regulation to promote apartheid and economic improvement for (in
particular originally poor, Afrikaans-speaking) whites. The business community
has stood for many market-oriented policies but has generally been divided over
tariff reductions. In any case, the NP and business are only part of a fairly large
coalition of interests pulling in the same direction. Where the 'standard
interpretation' most definitely does not fit the facts is when it comes to the role of
trade unions. Workers organised in the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) have, ever since the freeing of Nelson Mandela in February 1990,
been in the forefront in trying to devise for the the 'tripartite allance' (COSATU,
ANC and the South African Communist Party, SACP), a set of long-termpolicies
for economic restructuring and growth. There are of course intern al divisions
within COSA TU on these issues and not all liberal policy prescriptions have won
wholehearted support. Privatisation of public utilities and the speed of tariff
reform are particularly contentious issues among unionists. Nevertheless, although
many people'sexpectations may be 'high' and 'unrealistic', this is not necessarily
true of the most organised among the ANC's constituency. This has had a notable
effect on policy.
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There is of coursea confluenee of severalfactors which explain the change
to liberalism in South Africa as elsewhere. Among them are the often-mentioned
fall of communism and the disappearance of the bipolar world, the growing global
influence of business in an age of fallng barriers to capital transfers and trade, the
increased hegemony of institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IM)
and the World Bank, the need to placate domestic property owners who happ en to
be whites, etc. In such circumstances, one could argue, what would be truly
remarkable was if the ANC went against the grain and stared to nationalise banks
and industries, tighten capital controls and raise tariffs. But we know such
argument to be false, from African as well as other experience. Even with the
economy in shambles and all the forces of the world seemingly arrayed against
them, governing elites have been known to resist 'inevitable' liberalisation of the
economy if sufficiently fearful of losing power resources, opportunities for graft
or domestic political support.
South Africa's economy, while growing slowly, is neither debt-ridden nor
in severe external imbalance. The budget deficit is set to dec1ine to a level just
below 6 per cent of GDP during the 1995/96 fiscal year. The rate of inflation is
rather stable around L O per cent. Economic circumstances do not directly compel
South Africa to liberalise, and the direct influence upon policy of the IMF and the
World Bank is consequently smalL. While the fall of communism certainly spurred
the rethinking that has gone on within the ANC, the SACP and COSATU, this and
other external ideological and political forces are only loosely constraining. When
explaining economic policies in South Africa, we probably need to devote most of
our attention to domestic factors. We feel this argument is sound although there is
no way we can actually measure the relative weight of the various potential
explanatory factors.
Judged in isolation, some aspects of the South African situation seem to
accord fairly well with the "honeymoon thesis" presented in the theory section
above. The ANC received c10se to two-thirds of the votes in 1994. The GNU was
formed, as required by the interim constitution, with participation from the ANC,
the NP and Inkatha. This government, which is of course supported by an
overwhelming majority in parliament, moved fairly rapidly to design the policies
of liberalisation we have described. But, contrary to the honeymoon thesis, many
of these policies had been fairly extensively debated, prior to the elections, in the
National Economic Forum where trade unions met with business associations and
government officials. Emphasis was therefore placed from the start on mobilising
support from what could otherwise be called South Africa's 'vested interests'. The
resultant policies are implemented.jn a gradual fashion rather than as 'shock
therapy' designed to take civil society by surprise (which is also not called for by
the state of the economy). A significant part of this project is to study the proeess
of policy deliberation within the NEF, the National Manpower Commssion
(NMC) which dealt with labour relations issues, and the successor to these two
bodies, the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).
NEDLAC was created in early 1995. By undertaking such detailed analysis, we
expect to be able to delineate quite accurately how the various powerful domestic
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actors - businessassociations,labour unions, the oldNP government and the
ANC - defined their interests initially, as well as how positions changed in the
course of the deliberations. Such a detailed analysis has still not been completed,
but a start was made during fieldwork in 1994 and wil be followed up by more
fieldwork in 1996. We rely heavily on interviews with major participants in the
deliberations and with staff associated with the NEF, NMC and NEDLAC.
Because negotiations were conducted with some amount of secrecy, we failed to
get access to written minutes from meetings. Some organisations were also
reluctant to give us written material on their policy positions. Ho~~ever, there were
sometimes ways around this and we do have access to important statements of
initial policy positions on the various issues debated. The contents of the
agreements reached are also to a large extent available in written form. The local
press is also a valuable source of information, as are some local scholarly studies
(although these are not always painstakingly empirical).
The healthy lack of commitment to past dogma characteristic of South
Africa's new political elite may be partly accounted for by that elite's lack of
entrenchment in the bureaucracy (cf. Geddes 1994, 1995 and the theoretical
discussion above). It is the old Afrikaner elite which is thus entrenched, a fact that
also explains the weakness of COSA TU in the public sector. COSA TU is
strongest in the largely privately-owned mining and manufacturing sectors and this
may account for the willngness of COSA TU to contemplate policies designed to
enhance efficiency, competitiveness and growth over the longer term. Indeed, the
trade unions linked to COSA TU have long argued that there is a need for
restructuring of South African industry, and for workers to 'drive the process'.
Although it was always a bit overoptimistic to expect the unions rather than the
governmentitself to-alwaysbe.in the forefrontof policy changes, South African
unions certainly have played a large role. The very establishment of the NEF came
as a result of COSATU pressure, as we shall see below. Unions have sometimes
been as wiling as have sections of business to contemplate policy measures which
may hurt in the short run.
By arguing that COSATU's crucial role in the establishment of corporatist
institutions in South Africa should be seen against the background that COSA TU
and other black unions organise the sectors exposed to competition, we link up to
the generalliterature on the 'rise and dec1ine' of democratic corporatism. Although
our argument on this particular score is stil undeveloped, we present a rough
sketch of the state of our thinking so far. An important argument says that
corporatist institutions worked well only in a specific historical period (roughly,
after World War Il up until the mid-1970s). This period was characterised by
gradual liberalisation of trade in goods but extensive capital controls (for example,
Moses 1994, 1995). When, in the late 1970s, capital started to flow more freely
between countries, national policy autonomy became heavily restricted because
monetary policy had to be redirected towards maintaining external balance and a
competitive currency. Cheap credit policies could no longerbe used, and
devaluation could only be resorted to with difficulty. Fiscal policy became the
main device for dealing with recessions and this limited the possibility for
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resorting to Keynesian counter-cyclical policiesó With fewer policy tools at hand,
governments became unable to underwrite corporatist deals between business and
labour. Businesses increasingly demanded greater labour market flexibility so as
to increase competitiveness under a (semi- )fixed exchange rate.
While this argument has its greatest utilty when analysing countries in
Europe where integration is very far advanced and where monetary union is an
aim, the argument has been generalised beyond Europe (an example is Nelson
1994). It also crops up in the South African debate (Tørres 1994: 66; Baskin 1993:
10). ane problem with the argument is that it fles in the face of Spanish and
Australian experience in the 1980s. This experience strongly suggests that
corporatist 'pacts' between government, labour and business can sometimes be
fashioned in the context of (and are indeed a response to the perceived need for)
extensive liberalisation. We are talking not only of liberalised trade in goods but
also of freer capital flows (de la Dehesa 1994; Archer 1992).
A different interpretation sees corporatism as a set of institutions that
typically arise in small, trade-dependent countries where labour and business
perceive a need to remain competitive in export markets. An early formulation
along these lines is Katzenstein (1985). Recently Karl Ove Moene and Michael
Wallerstein (1995) have interpreted the rise and decline in Norway, Sweden and
Denmark of a specific corporatist institution, centralised wage bargaining, along
similar lines. According to Moene and Wallerstein, centralised wage bargaining
constituted ameans whereby capital and labour in the export sectors gained
controlover wage formation in the entire economy. As employment in the
export -oriented industries decreased over the decades, and as it increased in the
non-traded goods and public sectors, centralised wage negotiations became
-disassociated from the goal of maintaining competitiveness. Instead, they were
used by public sector unions to achieve interoccupational income equality. Within
the export sectors, business and labour joined hands to demolish the system when
it no longer served their interests (Moene and Wallerstein 1995). By implication,
the reduced support in Northern Europe for corporatist arrangements have
relatively little to do with increased globalisation and market integration and a lot
more to do with changing employment patterns, changes that are not discernible to
the same extent in South Africa although the country is far from unaffected by
them. Crucial from the viewpoint of the politics of COSA TU and South African
business associations, however, is that they have a common interest in policies
which enhance long-term competitiveness in the private sector. There are other
obstacles to the long-term effective functioning of corporatism in South Africa,
notably the lesser degreeof centralisation of. unions and business associations in
that country than in Northern Europe (Baskin 1993). These are issues which wil
be explored further as this project develops.
South Africa's current liberalisation effort is certainly helped by the
prudent macro-economic management of the previous regime as well as by the
fact that in the mid-1980s that regime got rid of quantitative import controIs,
instituted export subsidies and devalued the currency to a leve! more suited to
encouraging manufactured exports. The economic dislocations have therefore not
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been nearly. as large as Inmost Latin American, AfricaIlor EasternEuropean
countries undertaking economic liberalisation. Nevertheless, the country is faced
with some fairly hard choices over import tariffs, labour market legislation, level
and direction of government expenditure, privatisation and deregulation that
involve real political conflcts. These conflicts are inherently difficult to handle in
the best of circumstances. In South Africa they must be dealt with against the
background of decades of struggle inflamed by polarising ideologies.
The main argument is that the South African experiment with the NEF,
NMC and now NEDLAC is extremely interesting because it may come to
represent a distinct contribution to the theory and practice of economic
policy-making in the developing world: A democratic-corporatist institutional
arrangement involving all major elements of civil society, launched not as a
government device to coopt business and labour to its designs but actually as a
result of lobbying undertaken by business associations and, in particular, trade
unions, and in which the terms for South Africa's reintegration into the world
economy can be negotiated. We wil try to document this assertion before going
into some detail on the nature of the deliberations undertaken within the NEF,
NMC and NEDLAC.
South African labour relations before 1990
South Africa's black, or non-racial, trade unions were built in a highly repressive
political dimate. In 1924, Africans were excluded from registered unions and
could not bargain collectively. This did not change until the 'Wiehahn reforms'
1979-1984. There were unregistered black unions and they formed the South
.. AfricanC6ngressOfTradeUiii()ns (SACTU) in 1955and allied with the ANC.
They were subjected to crushing defeat at the hands of the government in the
1960s. In the 1970s black unions again began to grow. After the Wiehahn reforms
such growth was massive. Because of the experience of repression, the union
movement was for a long time divided between so-called 'workerists' and
'populists'. The former did not wantto eng age in wider struggles for political
rights on the pattern of SACTU, because they feared government repression and
also suspected that more immediate issues such as wages and working conditions
would be subordinated to the nationalist struggle. 'Populists' maintained that
workplace issues were inseparable from wider community struggles and the fight
against apartheid (Baskin 1991). COSATU, formed in 1985 as a national
federation, can be interpreted as an organisational fusion of these otherwise
divergent tendencies.Within COSATU, those who wanted to get involved in
anti-apartheid mobilisation prevailed. They stressed the need for cross-dass
allances while also upholding the principles of dass struggle, working-class
leadership and the goal of socialism. But 'workerist fear of being dictated to by
self-appointed community leaders and nationalist politicians was placated by
COSATU's strong emphasis on internal democracy - 'mandates' and 'report-backs'.
COSATU became a fairly strong national federation of democratic trade unions
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conscious of the need to reconcileclass-based demands with wider. collective
goals - socalled 'social-movement unionism' or 'political unionism' (Lambert and
Webster 1988; Seidman 1994). The launch of COSATU set off a proeess of union
mergers into industry-based organisations that became strong enough to resist
repression and engage in negotiations with the far-sighted sections of business.
In order to explain the emergence of such negotiations one needs also to
analyse changing interests in the business community. Merle Lipton (1985) argues
forcefully that aparheid was far from functional for the growth of capitalism,
contrary to the views of South African Marxists, including many prominent
COSATU organisers. It would takeus.too farto~gointo these issues in detail here.
Suffice it to say that as the economy grew more complex and the need for black
skils increased, apartheid policies such as reservation of skiled jobs for whites,
controls on the movement of Africans, the enforced maintenance of a migrant
labour system, and other restrictions became antithetical to the efficient
functioning of the economy. Political unrest and rising strike activity also pointed
up the need for business to have black leaders with whom to negotiate.
Businesspeople began to lobby the NP government for reforms, including the legal
recognition of black unions. Importantly, and as stressed by Lipton, businessmen
and their organisations did not have uniform positions on the various issues
involved. Among the business associations, the Federated Chamber of Industries
(FCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce (Assocom) were fairly liberal,
while the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA)
and especially the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) were conservative. However,
the tendency was for even the AHI to support more reformist policies during the
1970s. By legally recognising African trade unions, businesspeople hoped they
....could restore industrial peace.m They also hoped that regularised collective
bargaining would provide a model for handling the wider political conflct within
the country (Lipton 1985: 173).
The explosion of unrest in the 1980s confounded hopes of greater stabilty.
Instead, there were massive increases in strikes, sit-ins and stayaways. Police were
frequently called in to detain union leaders and break strikes, often with deadly
result. This was especially the case during the succes sive states of emergency from
1985 on (Baskin 1991). Renegotiation of a 'social contract between white property
owners and the largely black working class, and the establishment of new and
more cooperative economic and political institutions, was exceedingly difficult in
a situation where such negotiations were influenced by a 'third party', the NP
government, which was far from a neutral arbiter but rather a self-interested,
ideologically-inclinedactor that of ten worked at cross-purposes with perceived
mutual interests of business and labour.
In the mid-1980s, prominent businessmen began to make overtures to the
exiled ANC which they felt had to be drawn into the process of negotiating a more
democratic future. Such businessmen realised that stable industrial relations could
only be achieved if aparheid was eliminated (Lambert and Webster 1988: 36-37).
However, increased strike activity and general protest led the government, with
the support of large parts of business, to restrict trade union rights in 1987 by
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introducing a Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA). Among the effects of
the Act were greater employer discretion regarding dismissals and retrenchment,
increased restrictions on strikes and related activity (such as sympathy strikes and
consumer boycotts), facilitation of damages actions by employers against striking
union members, and encouragement of union fragmentation (Benjamin 1990;
Baskin 1991: 263-265,291). The LRAA touched off a long campaign by unions to
pre serve earlier gains. Despite this polarisation, COSA TU continued to negotiate
with the employers' federation, the South African Consultative Committee on
Labour Affairs (SACCOLA), over the LRAA (Fine and Webster 1990: 269-271;
Baskin 1991: 291 ff, 325-326).
By successfully carring out ilegal strikes and protests in the midst of a
state of emergency, COSA TU effectively foreclosed the option of repression as a
strategy for dealing with unions in the future. In May 1990, a few months after the
unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela, a deal was struck over
the Labour Relations Act. COSATU, the National Congress of Trade Unions
(NACTU), and SACCOLA signed the Laboria Minute, which aimed to revers e the
changes introduced in the LRAA. The three civil society organisations then jointly
appealed to the government to write a new Labour Relations Act. After some
foot-dragging and faced with continued demonstrations, the government
concurred (Baskin 1991: 437-440; Roux 1990). The resulting
government-business-labour accord promised to extend trade union rights to all
workers and laid down the principle that all future changes to labour law be
subject to tripartite negotiation before being presented to Parliament. Unions
agreed to sit on a 'restructured' National Manpower Commssion (NMC), which
had previously been an advisory body composed of government officials and
_. appointedexpertsbutnowtook un more of the character of a representative body.
A Labour Relations Act based on the new agreement was introduced in February
1991. ParalleI to the opening of negotiations on the transition to majority rule, the
start had been made to a proeess whereby civil society organisations cooperated to
set up democratic-corporatist institutions for the deliberation of policy, drag gin g
an initially reluctant government along.
Labour - business - government relations during the transition
It is no accident that the COSATU-NACTU-SACCOLA agreement was signed
soon after the release of Nelson Mandela. This was the point at which it became
clear that negotiations would start in earnest about a democratic future for South
Africa. From then on, the authorities cöuld not be counted on to serve as
strike-breakers and union bashers. All incentives changed in favour of negotiation
and peaceful resolution of conflict. This became all the more imperative because
of the perceived ne ed on the part of business to impress upon the ANC and its
allies that private enterprise and a market-based economy could be made
compatible with the interests of the majority. The old idea among liberal
businessmen of using cooperative arrangements in the labour relations field as a
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springboard for. launching wider . negotiations on political and economic
institutions resurfaced.
Labour unions were cognisant of the fragilty of their newly-won power.
The time of transition to democracy was also a time of recession and of pressures
to liberalise the economy, both of which threatened jobs and union strength. Soon
after the signing of the Laboria Minute, unions began discussing how they could
develop a coherent economic strategy so as to meet the challenges of world-wide
integration of markets, introduction of new ('post-Fordi st' technologies, and
global away-turn from protectionism (von Holdt,.-1991b). In response to these
challenges, some unionists perceived. a need to change from a 'politics of
resistance' to a 'politics of reconstruction' and to "take responsibility for economic
growth and development" (von Holdt 1991a: 15-16).
As we have seen above, a large group within COSA TU were strongly
sceptical of nationalist politicians and wanted unions to keep their distance from
organisations such as the ANC. The strength of such sentiment put pressure on the
federation's leaders to demonstrate that it could act as an independent force within
the tripartite ANC-SACP-COSATU allance, that they could exert real influence
on behalf of workers. COSATU therefore took care to formulate independent
policy positions, to take initiative in developing the alliance's economic and labour
policies, and to seek a large role for itself in negotiations about the country's
future. The organisation was rather well placed to do so at a time when it was the
only member of the allance with a real organisational presence inside the country
- this represented a window of opportunity that CO SA TU was wise enough to
exploit. But the relationship with the ANC was not without its frustrations.
Complaints were heard that the ANC lacked a culture of democracy and
_.. consultation, thatit negotiatedwith the National Party. insecret, and. that it was
dominated by exiles with little understanding of the importance of mass action and
thorough organisation (von Holdt 1991c; Schreiner 1991).
As early as the fall of 1990, the National Unions of Metalworkers of South
Africa (NUMSA) resolved to develop its own economic policies regardless of the
policies of the ANC and SACP. Only from this independent position would it
negotiate with political parties for a 'reconstruction accord', to be implemented
after political power was captured. In part, this NUMSA strategy developed in
response to overtures from business to join them in negotiating a 'social contract
involving wage restraint, fewer strikes, increased productivity and labour market
flexibilty. NUMSA felt that such a social contract must be avoided, because
businessmen did not have a national perspective on things but only looked at
issues from the perspective of their ownbusinesses and with a view to their own
profits (von Holdt 1991 b: 20-22). This charge of employer myopia was frequently
heard over the next few years, as union leaders argued for the development of a
national plan to restructure the economy so as to counter the sectoral and
plant-level initiatives taken by business and the NP government (SALB 1992: 15)
However, the scepticism of negotiating with employers was not shared by all
within COSATU. John Copelyn, at the time general secretary of the South African
Clothing and Textiles Workers' Union (SACTWU), argued that national-leve!
26
-bargaining.with businesswasimportantto the unions as ameans of-keeping their
independence from political parties. A new governments proper role would be,
according to Copelyn, to give practical effect to agreements reached by civil
society organisations (Copelyn, 1991: 32).
The labour federation tried, but failed, to get independent representation at
the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CaDESA) negotiations on a new
constitution, but succeeded in its campaign for the establishment of a National
Economic Forum (NEF). The setting up of the NEF was agreed to in early 1992
after a series of demonstrations by COSATU that were initially motivated by
opposition to the governments intt6ducing a value-added tax (VA T) but soon
developed into general resistance against 'unilateral' implementation of policy
reforms by an increasingly ilegitimate regime (SALB 1992). On the concrete
issue of V AT, COSATU managed to force the government to reduce it slightly to
L O per cent and to exempt some foodstuffs altogether. The first meeting of the
NEF was held in November 1992.
The idea of establishing the NEF was initially treated with quite some
scepticism by both the NP and ANC. A major issue of contention was whether the
NEF shouldbe merely advisory or become a real bargaining forum and hence, in
effect, a policy-making body. Neither the NP nor the ANC wanted business and
labour to be able to dictate policies to parliament and to government. The
government argued that unions and employers could send representatives to the
long-standing Presidents Economic Advisory Council, but COSATU refused.
That would have signified cooptation; the unions would have been used to
legitimise policies without having the means to ensure concrete benefits for their
members. The same problem had arisen earlier, in 1990-1991, with regard to the
NationalManpowerCommission.COSATU's positionthen had been that once the
Commssion was turned into a truly representative body, the government could not
choose to disregard its decisions. The trade union federation had wanted the NMC
to have near veto rights over labour legislation (CALS 1991: 77), although this
was soon modified to a right to draft legislation and to have that legislation placed
before Parliament without alteration (Schreiner 1991: 39). Several leading
politicians within both the NP and the ANC upheld the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty and refused to accord either the NEF or the NMC formal
decision-making status. (SAIRR 1993: 324-327). Some in the ANC also felt that
the NEF would divert attention from negotiations about the new constitution.
Furthermore, it would become superfluous once the ANC became the governing
party and would be able to act in the interests of the working class (Bird and
Schreiner 1992: 31).
Business tended to lean towards the governments position that the proper
role of corporatist institutions was an advisory one, perhaps realising that in a
system like South Africa's, the policy-making role of extra-parliamentary bodies
could not be formalised without creating a tangle of constitutional problems. The
most pressing issue for business was to make the institutions as representative as
possible, so as to prepare the ground for the development of truly broad consensus
on a future economic strategy for the country. On this issue, it differed with a
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government thatargued that business should berepresented bya single
organisation, SACCOLA. Employers, however, countered that SACCOLA was
their representative on labour matters only and that all major national associations
should be individually represented - the South African Chamber of Business
(SACOB - a result of the 1990 merger of FCI and Assocom), AHI, SEIFSA, the
Chamber of Mines and the National African Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC).
Eventually, this inclusive approach prevailed (SALB 1992: 14-15).
COSA TU had to back down on the issue of formal decision-making
power. Nevertheless, it became a matter of common understanding among the
various actors that it would become exceedingly difficult for any government to
ignore agreements between business and labour that had been thrashed out within
these institutions. Events were to show that the NP government, as it became
increasingly ineffectual and powerless with the advent of regime change, came to
rely quite heavily on the NEF to decide urgent issues. It was also understood at the
time that a future government dominated by the ANC could not easily override the
NEF since the party placed so much emphasis on the need for a 'participatory'
democracy that would extend beyond the mere act of voting every five years (Patel
1993: 59). When the successor to the NMC and NEF, NEDLAC, delivered its first
major compromise on yet another Labour Relations Act in 1995, this piece of
legislation was hurried through parliament without alteration or even significant
time for public debate. The corporatist institution had, informally but effectively,
become a legislative body.
Development of policy positions
Leftist opponents of corporatism anclsocial accordspointecl out that wage restraint
and less strike activity were the usual concessions unions were expected to make
and that this very fact proved that corporatist deals were inherently detrimental to
the interests of wokers. Supporters of corporatism were at pains to point out that
compromises would only be entered into to the extent that they be par of a
strategy leading to socialism (Schreiner 1991: 35; Bird and Schreiner 1992: 23;
Godongwana 1992: 23). In 1992, halting strikes was rejected outright by
COSATU's Sam Shilowa as a possible concession although it might not be ruled
out in the future if conditions were right (SALB 1992: 16). This is stil a thorny
issue, although in fact the number of person-days lost due to strikes has come
down after the 1994 elections. When we interviewed union leaders in late 1994,
they maintained that an incomes policy, with attendant wage restraint and lower
militancy, could bé contemplated but that thé necessary structures for collective
bargaining had to be put in place first. COSA TU pressed for mandatory,
centralised collective bargaining both at the national leve! and within each
industry. Once this set of institutions was in place, COSATU maintained, unions,
employers and government officials could start the debate on an incomes policy in
the light of industry restructuring and an increased 'social wage' - greater
government expenditure on social welfare, education, and active labour market
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policies (retraining of dismissed workers). The new Labour Relations Act that just
passed NEDLAC and parliament, represents a compromise between COSA TU and
employers who generally pressed for greater decentralisation of bargaining. The
system is to remain voluntary and this means that the degree of centralisation of
wage bargaining wil vary from industry to industry as at present. It is
industry-level in some important sectors such as mining and engineering,
plant-level in others. There wil be industry-level bodies for the negotiation of
issues that have to do with restructuring, however, plus of course the
national-leve! NEDLAC. This has happened too recently for us to have had time
to adequately study the implications,' bunhe unions fear that the wage bargaining
system, being neither here nor there in teríns of degree of centralisation, wil not
be able to underpin effective deals on the economy in the future. The academic
literature also indicates that either highly centralised, or decentralised, wage
bargaining systems are most conducive to industrial peace and economic growth
(Calmfors and DriffiI1988).
In resisting further centralisation of wage bargaining, employers may have
ca1culated that COSA TU would not have been strong and centralised enough to
have been able to make such industry-level and national wage deals stick.
COSA TV itself admits that its members are rather militant and not always reliable
when it comes to respecting agreements made by their leaders. Employers may
also have ca1culated that fundamental agreement on issues such as tariffs,
privatisation, macro-economic policy would be possible to arrive at within
NEDLA C even in the absence of formal incomes policies. After all, this was what
happened within the NEF during 1993 and 1994. Among the successes of the NEF
was the participants' ability to come up with a schedule for reducing tarriffs that
went a long-wayto.satisfying GATT. It wouldtake us too far togo into more
detail here, but both unions, employers and former NP government officials agree
that in the absence of the NEF, South Africa would have been unable to produce a
policy on tariff reductions at a time when the NP government ,was a lame duck.
In an important respect, the discussions on corporatism that took place on
the South African political left can be seen as a continuation of the old
workerist-populist debate that had earlier taken place in the trade unions. In the
1990s as in the mid-1980s, those who favoured active engagement with the
government and with business within the country's evolving bargaining fora - and
thereby accepted the potential for positive-sum outcomes of social conflcts - won
out over militants who viewed conflcts as inherently zero-sum and all
compromise as capitulation. Pressing for the establishment of a restructured NMC,
of theNEF and NEDLAC and.participating actively in these bodies represented in
fact but a logical extension of the principle of political unionism. It was also
necessary if unionists were to win concrete gains for their members. In the words
of NUMSA's Enoch Godongwana, "(w ) hat do we tell the 9000 workers in the t yre
manufacturing industry when tariffs are removed and their jobs are at stake? Do
we tell them to wait for a socialist revolution?" (Godongwana 1992: 21).
Despite the continuing rhetoric about socialism, COSA TU developed aset
of more immediately realisable goals. In the words of the deputy general secretary
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of the COSATU-affiliated SouthernAfricanClothing and Textile WorkersUnion,
Ebrahim Pate!: "(COSATU has been) absorbing the lessons from the decline of
trade unions elsewhere in the world - unless the movement addressed the needs of
the broader society at the same time as that of its constituency, it would become
isolated, deemed no more than the voice of another special interest gro up ...
(COSATU also) accepted that international trade liberalisation would
fundamentally restructure the South African economy" (Patel 1993:3). The union
federation's concern with economic effciency can also be gleaned from more
concrete policy statements callng for stepped-up production of manufactured
goods which meet the needs of the poor and are "cömparable in terms of priceand
quality with international standards. In this way, local production wil not need to
be protected with tariffs. This wil also make the economy competitive in
international trade" (COSATU 1992: 73). The trick, of course, is to be able to
produce cheaper goods while at least maintaining real wages and jobs. Increased
productivity is key to the success ofthis strategy.
In April 1993, the COSATU-sponsored Industrial Strategy Project (IS P)
presented some preliminary results of its research into manufacturing sector
restructuring. Although this was not a policy statement attributable to COSA TU as
such, some of the points raised were quite interesting to the extent that they
revealed the thinking of at least some labour leaders. Reporting on a World Bank
document on the trade regime in South Africa, the ISP group noted that although
the leve! of overall South African tariffs is not very high, the dispersion of such
tariffs is. Furthermore, export subsidies had only very ineffectively countered the
anti-export bias of the system, and at high co st to the treasury. The ISP group
supported this analysis by the World Bank and agreed with its primar
recommendations that South AfrIca must become more outward-'oriented by
rationalising its tariff system and providing exporters with automatic access to
inputs at world prices. After this had been achieved, overall levels of protection
should be lowered in a gradual manner so as to avoid loss of industrial capacity.
Some selective protection should continue. However, basic wage goods - having
benefitted from particularly high trade barriers in the past - should be liberalised
immediately so as to make them more affordable to the pOOL (Joffe et aL. 1993).
aur interviews in 1994 revealed that this particular suggestion was extremely
controversial among trade unionists. The most highly protected sectors, some of
which produce basic wage goods such as c10thing and textiles, are often the most
labour-intensive. Nevertheless, unions such as that for textiles and clothing
(SACTWU) have generally been more wiling to discuss reductions in protection
than have employers in thesesectors. Negotiations on tariff reform for textiles and
for the motor industry have been extremely protracted. Only in June 1995 did the
trade and industry minister Manue! finally decide the issue in favour of fairly rapid
and extensive tariff cuts. We wil look into these sectoral negotiations in detail
during the course of the project.
Much of the ISP's analysis and suggestions were later incorporated into the
report, Makng DemocracyW ork, produced in December 1993 by the ANC's
Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG, 1993). Recommendations on tariffs
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were cautious, as wereHsuggestionson export. subsidies. But exceedingly high
tariffs should be down-sized, and lobbying by individual firms discouraged
through the introduction of more uniform tariffs. Significantly, exchange rate
management should be flexible, according to the report, and aim at maintaining
the real effective rate; i.e., the South African rand should be allowed to slide so as
to make up for a higher domestic than international inflation rate - a policy that
would help promote manufactured exports.
The private/public ownership issue has been a particularly thorny one for
the liberation movement. For a long time, nationalisation of 'the commanding
heights' of the economy was central to. the liberation movements programme of
redistribution. As recently as Februar 1990, Nelson Mandela maintained that "the
nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the
ANC and achange or modification of our views in this reg ard is inconceivable"
(quoted in Kentridge 1993: 3). Nevertheless, a more flexible position was soon
adopted. After a March 1992 meeting, COSATU came up with the following
rather unexceptional candidates for full state control: education, health, posts and
telecommunications, electricity supply, water provision, public transport and steel.
State takeovers in other sectors would be contemplated, but only after
"consultation and negotiation". A much more useful suggestion, given the
oligopolistic structure of South African industry, was to formulate anti-trust
policies in the interest of increased competition and efficiency (SAIRR, 1993:
330-331). It is this latter suggestion that has become ANC policy recently.
The MERG report said that "the decision on whether an enterprise should
be public1y or privately owned should be made on a case-by-case basis" (MERG
1993: 273) although the gist of the reports argument was in favour of state-owned
enterprises, which-were seen as able to increase Investmentand promote
efficiency if only politicians would refrain from interfering in their operations - a
sweet dream, hardly down to earth. The report also contained a commitment to
renationalise recently privatised enterprises but stressed that foreign investors
should be given a firm guarantee that their assets would not be taken over by the
government. The report also recommended state marketing of certain minerals. On
the issue of nationalisation, unions soon became increasingly divided. In July
1993, NUMSA and SACTWU held their congresses. While 59 per cent of
NUMSA congress delegates voted in favour of a resolution supporting
"nationalisation without compensation", the economic policy statement adopted by
the SACTWU conference recognised that in practice nationalisation could not
take place without compensation, and that such compensation would be "beyond
the resources of a democratic state". Even more tellngly, the SACTWU document
went on to argue that "the inefficiencies associated with state-owned enterprises
elsewhere in the world would be difficult to avoid. The goal of greater economic
democracy in state-owned enterprises has been elusive elsewhere,and no concrete
proposals have been advanced to suggest that we can achieve these ...". (SALB
1993a: 17-18).
The reports referred to above were used in thepreparation of a joint
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) by the ANC, COSATU and
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the South African NationalCivics Organisation, under the coordinationof former
COSATU general secretary Jay Naidoo, be fore the April 1994 elections. The RDP
went through six drafts and was extensively discussed at various meetings and
conferences of the democratic movement. Debates revealed three main issues of
contention: macro-economic stability, nationalisation, and cooperation with
business. At COSATU's special congress in September 1993, for example,
delegates from several union affiliates voiced the opinion that an overly firm stress
on macro-economic stability could block significant redistribution. It was also felt
that "nationalisation of strategic sectors should be included" and that relations
with business would not alwaysbe cooperative (SALB 1993b: 23). Significantly,
however, few voices were apparently raised against the documents emphasis on
lower tariffs and greater world-market orientation. Critics made little headway in
pressuring the ANC and COSATU to adopt more 'radical' postures on government
expenditure, nationalisation and relations with business. The RDP introduced the
idea that the public sector could be reduced if this would "enhance efficiency,
advance affirmative action and empower the historically disadvantaged" (RDP
1994: 35). After extensive internal and public debate, and after participation in the
NEF where COSATU representatives - many of whom later became government
officials and ministers - the tripartite alliance faced the electorate in April 1994
with an economic programme that said farewell to statist socialism and opened up
debate as to how market-orientation and egalitarian principles could be effectively
combined in a developing country.
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III:mCommonMethodologieal Considerations
In the sections above, we have extracted two hypotheses regarding the prospects
for implementing economic reforms in democratic institutional settings. The
honeymoon the sis and the corporatist thesis have been discussed against two
separate cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia and South Africa. More
comprehensive analyses and theory testing wil be presented at later stages. What
we try to do is to confirm or disconfirm established analytical positions. We do
not compare South Africa and Zambia. But our studies are comparative in the
sense that experiences in the two countries are held up against comparative theory.
We wil also aim to compare policy outcomes over time - and thus between
changing institutional settings - within each case (Rustow 1991).
The research projects presented here are case studies. Case studies, we
argue, imply a rather holistic approach, as their purpose is to examine the
historical, economic, political and cultural features of individual cases (Bradshaw
and Wallace 1991: 165, Ragin 1987: 49). By analysing such cases, we hope to
avoid some of the problems associated with cross-sectional analyses. When a great
number of countries are compared, it is difficult to cover long time spans (Nelson
1994a) and studies become ahistorical. It is also difficult in these studies to
incorporate very detailed information on institutions and other contextual
knowledge (Geddes 1994, Hawkins 1991). Cross-sectional studies of the politics
of economic reform therefore of ten emphasise the immediate reasons for
reform/failure to reform whereas the deeper roots of political resistance/support
are largely ignored. Cross-sectional analyses may reveal interesting correlations
between different social phenomena present at the same time but fail to reveal
.. . .how thesephenomena_are_causallyrelated. In many.interest group analyses,these
weaknesses are noticable. Due to the methodology employed and the large number
of cases inc1uded, the fact that interest group pressure may change considerably
over time, and during the process of implementing economic reform, is largely
ignored (Hawkins 1991).
The literature on economic reform discussed so far has been much
influenced by the 'new institutionalIsm' (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992;
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, March and Olsen, 1989; North 1990; Cook and Levi
1990). The new institutionalism is important for, among other things, pointing out
that interests should not be seen as directly deducible from some extra- or
pre-political, economic logic, as well as for contributing to explaining why certain
practices and policies persist long after they have apparently lost their rationale. It
is our belief that the way political and economic reformsare undertaken, may have
deep historical roots and that these roots sometimesare peculiar to a given
country. The particular, nevertheless, is best understood in the context of the
general, and that is why we relate our institutionalist analyses to the comparative
cross-sectional studies.
It is not possible to generalise from a single case. Therefore, the theoretical
relevance of case studies is determined by the extent to which they refer to
theoretical debates and contribute thereby to the refinement of theory (George
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1979, EcksteIn 1975). Inthis sense,our caseanalyses should become components
in a longer process of theory-building. Because the case studies are joined to a
wider comparative debate they may be considered theory-informing and possibly
generalisable (Glaser and Strauss 1961, George 1979, Rustow 1991). According to
Arendt Lijphart's categories (1971), our analyses can be called theory-confirming
or theory-infirming case studies as both analyses take a theoretically established
thesis as its point of departure and aims to either confirm, and strengthen the
hypothesis, or weaken it (Lijphart 1971: 691-693). Confirmations of the
theoretical hypotheses may contribute to strengthening the theoretical positions.
Infirming results in relation to theoty,however, cannot be regarded as strong
enough evidence to deem the theoretical argument false. But they ought to
stimulate search for better or more general theory so as to account for the
newly-discovered anomalies.
Both research projects discussed here investigate processes of political and
economic change. Contextual data informing the process of change can be
obtained from a variety of sources such as statistics on macroeconomic policies
and electoral results, survey data, newspapers, and secondar sources. The study
of process, however, is inherently qualitative and the main sources of information
wil be obtained through personal, open-ended interviews. In order to examine the
interconnections between the two processes of reform, we ask actors in the
process, such as representatives of major interest groups, policy makers,
government ministers, donor representatives and bureaucrats to describe their
position and role in the processes of change. The extensive reliance upon personal
interviews as our source of information is also necessitated by the fact that we deal
to a large extent with current affairs. It is important to be aware that examination
of current proeesses tendsto highlight the roleof actors rather than the structural
and other constraints within which these actions take place evoluntarism') (Nelson
1994a: xv). This tendency may be further exacerbated in analyses relying heavily
on interview data, as some respondents tend. to distort the character and
importance of their own roles. Ideally, interview sources should be backed by
written sources. This is sometimes, but not always possible. But oral information
can and should be checked with other interviewees. Extensive fieldwork is
necessar .
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